Work-In-Progress by the
Center for Sustainable Peace and Economic Justice
UP PO Box 109, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City 1101
When the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 1 finally forged a Peace Accord, known as the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, on September 2, 1996, this event brought forth much hope among Filipinos in the process of finding a just and peaceful negotiated settlement to the centuries-old Bangsa Moro problem in Mindanao. After several attempts of peace negotiations to end an almost three decade civil war that had claimed over 120,000 peoples' lives in the Southern Philippines, this peace accord was seen as a historic breakthrough.
However, barely four years after the signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, the rebellion in Mindanao has not ended. They said it has only changed names.2 The recent resurgence of conflict in the Southern Philippines has escalated into an all-out armed confrontation between the Philippine Government (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)3 . The MILF, which is a breakaway group from the MNLF, now claims to be the "true" representative of the Moros in Mindanao, reasserting independence.
Contrary to the images of peace that usually come along a concluded peace settlement, what can be seen these days in Mindanao are hundreds of combatants and civilians killed or wounded and tens of thousands of families displaced as the armed conflict fast spread in many fronts. Hostilities have escalated in 9 municipalities of Maguindanao province, 5 in North Cotabato, 3 in Lanao del Sur, 1 in South Cotabato, and in the two cities of Cotabato and General Santos, all areas in the Southern Philippines. 4
The closure of the highways, actual damages to properties, as well as the exact number of casualties could not be accounted for to date. However, because of these recent events, death casualties on both camps are found to be bigger than any past hostilities monitored in the Philippines since 1997.
At an alarming rate, the escalation of armed conflict in the Southern Philippines has affected even other areas outside of these current "zones of war". Many foresee that if this shall not be resolved in due time, its effect shall spread all over the country.
In reflection, it has been argued that peace agreements may sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction.5 Kalevi Hosti 6 , in his study, supported this by saying that the success of any peace settlement depends, to a large extent, upon its ability to anticipate and devise means to cope with the issues of the future. Failure to anticipate "what tomorrow can bring" may set the stage in a particular setting for future eras of conflict and war.7
On the current resurgence and escalation of conflicts in Mindanao, such argument may prove to be true.
The 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement had aimed to end a three-decade civil war in the Southern Philippines. The inking of said accord was considered a milestone since earlier attempts to negotiate the cessation of hostilities in the Southern Philippines had failed to define a sustainable political settlement for the Muslims in Mindanao.
Initially, in 1976, a resolution of the Mindanao problem was seen to be at hand when Libya and other members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)9 persuaded the Philippine government and the MNLF leadership to accept regional autonomy as a compromise to the MNLF's original objective of struggling for an independent Bangsa Moro homeland. However, the consensus reached in the "1976 Tripoli Agreement" untangled in disputes and brought forth new conflicts over its implementation and within six months, the brutal war in Mindanao had resumed.
Nearly 20 years later, the Tripoli Agreement10 remained the frame of reference for the final peace accord reached between the Philippine government and the MNLF, again encouraged by the Islamic states. Under the Tripoli Agreement, not all items were immediately implementable. At least eight (8) major provisions were described "to be discussed later," which were as follows:
Only two (2) of the substantive provisions remained untouched: the one on foreign policy which was to fall within the competence of the central government, and another on the setting up of courts and the implementation of the Shariah or Islamic laws. The Muslims were to be represented in all courts, including the Supreme Court, subject to the usual qualifications.
To complete the process mentioned above, the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Accord was forged to cover the final agreement on the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter and in spirit which earlier were signed between the GRP and the MNLF on December 23, 1976.
There are two phases of the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. The first phase is a three-year transition period which would start upon the issuance of an Executive Order and creation of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) comprising of 1411 of Mindanao's 24 provinces and nine cities12 . This would be managed by a newly established Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and a Consultative Assembly.
During this first phase, the process of "integration" of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) would also start. As of August 1998, a total of 3,802 MNLF members were reported integrated into the AFP and the police, or 50.7% of the target of 7,500. 13
The first phase of the agreement covered the period from September 1996 to August 1999. During this period, some 8.9 billion pesos, mostly coming from the UN Multi-Donor Assistance Programme, was spent for development projects implemented by various government line agencies in different parts of the SZOPAD. After the signing of the agreement in 1996, people began believing that the newly created SZOPAD shall be a venue for radical and rapid changes since it became a major focus of the government's peace and development interventions in the Southern Philippines. Targeted large-scale projects included infrastructure, energy development, and irrigation systems. Projects for livelihood credit, aquaculture, housing, skills training, education and cooperatives in MNLF communities have been funded. And school buildings, health centers and water systems in the SZOPAD areas have also been put up. 14
However, despite these large-scale projects, the rating in the arena of development given by analysts to SZOPAD is very poor. They said that available resources have not brought forth significant gains to its three principal stakeholders: the Muslims, Christians and the Lumads in the SZOPAD, showing that equal focus to the three client groups could not be given at the same time.
In support to the confidence-building thrust of the 1996 Peace Agreement, the ARMM should have funded high impact development programmes since it covers four of the five predominantly Muslim provinces in Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Maguindanao). Reports say, however, that the ARMM under Misuari was deprived of 615 million pesos in annual seed money (earmarked for infrastructure projects), an arrangement which the region enjoyed during the terms of previous Regional Governors. Moreover, the ARMM's limited budget for infrastructure projects in 1998 was cut by 50% and sadly, less than 10% of the remaining 50% had been released as of September 1998 because of government revenue shortfall. 15
Because of unmet expectations that spectacular economic development shall happen in the SZOPAD, with the MNLF, without adequate financial or legal resources, mostly carrying the burden of meeting these expectations, there goes now a growing disenchantment in Mindanao with the 1996 Peace Accord.
This situation becomes more precarious as the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement enters its second phase of implementation.
The second phase of the 1996 Agreement involves a Congressional action for an amendment to or repeal of Organic Act (RA 6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new regional autonomous government (NRAG) and the specific area of autonomy thereof. Phase 2 covers the period from September 1999 onwards, with the hope that this phase would do most to meet Moro aspirations for real autonomy.
Earlier, between September to December 1996, during the ARMM elections, Nur Misuari, the MNLF Chair who was appointed Head of the SPCPD, ran for governor of the ARMM and won, with six MNLF leaders being elected to the Regional Legislative Assembly.
In 1998, a new President, Joseph Estrada was elected. MNLF leaders, save for one, lost their bids for local positions.
ARMM elections that were due in September 1999 were postponed. Three priority bills have been filed in Congress to amend the Organic Act on the ARMM, expanding it in accordance with the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. A plebiscite on the new autonomous region was due by the end of 1999, but was deferred.
This year 2000, the government's committee on local governments started to conduct series of hearings on the proposed expansion of the ARMM in Mindanao. Amid a most "optimistic scenario" of the inclusion of Basilan, Cotabato City and Marawi City in the ARMM, following the hearings, the committee has observed that there appears to be a growing discontent, which has become widespread, among Moro political leaders in Mindanao. More alarmingly, many people have also been opposing the ARMM expansion.
Barely a month after the signing of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, rebel strongholds of another Moro group, the MILF, began to bustle with activities of war in Mindanao. On December 3-5, 1996, the MILF, in a display of strength, held a huge assembly, called the Bangsa Moro People's Assembly, near Cotabato City, and declared its departure from the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement and reaffirmed their commitment, not to autonomy, but to independence.
In January 1997, the GRP and MILF representatives met and issued a joint statement while heavy fighting in Buldon (Maguindanao) between the government's armed forces and the MILF raged, leaving behind more than a hundred dead and marring the GRP-MILF's intent to talk peace.
On January 27, 1997, an initial accord was signed between the GRP and the MILF covering a six-point temporary truce applicable only in Buldon (Maguindanao) that included but not limited to the following:
The last arrangement – "as is, where is positions" for the warring parties was later found to be unfavorable since differing interpretation of this provision had caused several violations of the truce from both sides.
Another meeting in early February between the GRP and MILF representatives was suspended because of renewed fighting. In March 1997, as a result of the bombing of a Madrasah in Buldon that caused the death of 10 young students and their teacher on March 16, the two parties (GRP and MILF) met again and agreed to form an Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (ICMC), headed by Fr. Eliseo Mercado, OMI, current President of Notre Dame University and Floor Leader of the Consultative Assembly of the SPCPD.
Meetings between the GRP and MILF took place in April, May and June but bogged down by continued fighting between them.
In June 1997, the MILF were locked in battles with the government's Philippine Army, then launching its biggest offensive, for control of Camp Raja Muda, the MILF's second largest camp in Mindanao. Instantly, at least 75,000 people living around the camp were reported displaced and became refugees as a result.
After these intense fightings in Central Mindanao during the last week of June and first two weeks of July, then President Ramos authorized ARMM Governor Nur Misuari to establish contact with the MILF to get peace talks back on track.
On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF signed an Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) that resulted to the following:
The unwritten part of the agreement, however, was that the Philippine government would pull its forces out of the villages beside Camp Raja Muda.17
On September 12, 1997, the GRP and MILF signed the Implementing Administrative Guidelines on their Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities. This included the ground rules of the general cessation of hostilities that contained six items:
On November 14, 1997, the GRP and MILF signed the ceasefire agreement that classifies, among other things, kidnapping, summary execution, ambushes and bombings as "provocative and hostile acts."
In 1998, upon the election of a new president, Joseph Estrada, a new government negotiating panel was constituted to talk peace with the MILF.
On August 27, 1998, the GRP and MILF signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent.
On November 14, 1998, the GRP and MILF signed the Implementing Operational Guidelines of their Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities.
In 1999, new outbreaks of fighting between the MILF and the government's AFP were followed by another declaration of ceasefire. On February 10, both warring parties signed the Joint GRP-MILF Acknowledgment, and an Agreement to Reaffirm the Pursuit of Peace. A week later, on February 17, the GRP and MILF Coordinating Committees signed a Joint Statement on the Cessation of Hostilities.
On May 18, the GRP and MILF signed the Rules and Procedures in the Determination and Verification of the Coverage of the Cessation of Hostilities. Verification and recognition are confidence-building measures that will recognize the territories of the MILF while the peace talks are ongoing. It did not mean granting "belligerency" status to the MILF. The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) composed of GRP and MILF representatives was formed to undertake the verification activities of the said camps.18
On September 2, both GRP and MILF signed a statement for a joint effort to pursue a just, equitable and lasting peace.
On October 6, the GRP and MILF agreed to give more authority and substance to the general cessation of hostilities by authorizing the GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) to relay orders to the military Field commanders of both parties once the GRP-MILF Peace Panels have agreed to a cessation of hostilities. It was also agreed that "the military Field commanders of both parties shall immediately and strictly observe the orders of the GRP-MILF Peace Panels relayed to them by the GRP-MILF CCCH. The GRP-MILF CCCH shall inform the GRP-MILF Peace Panels of any GRP-MILF forces or Field commanders violating this agreement. It shall be the responsibility of the GRP-MILF Peace Panels to take immediate and necessary action t stop any violation and punish respective forces or military Field commanders who violate this agreement." This agreement serves as an addendum to the powers and functions of the GRP-MILF CCCH stipulated in the implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF AGCH.
On October 6, 1999, the second Joint GRP-MILF Acknowledgment was signed. It took several "battles" in Buldon, Raja Muda, Talayan, Datu Piang, Maganoy, Sultan sa Barongis, and Zamboanga del Sur before the Philippine government acknowledged seven (7) MILF camps out of more than 47 major and minor camps located in Mindanao which were submitted for recognition by the MILF.
MILF camps that were recognized included: Camp Abubakar (MILF Center Camp), Camp Darapanan, Camp Raja Muda, Camp Badre, Camp Omar --- all in the Province of Maguindanao, and Camp Busra and Camp Bilal --- both in the Province of Lanao del Sur. The acknowledgment was subjected to the following terms and conditions:
On October 25, the GRP and MILF held the opening of their formal peace talks.
During the year, BAYAN ("Bagong Alyansang Makabayan") reported that the government has deployed to Mindanao an additional seven (7) Philippine Army battalions, 2 ½ Scout Ranger battalions and six Special Forces battalions. MILF strongholds in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat have been the target of the combined elements of the 6th Infantry Division, a brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division and another brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. Majority of the military's armored vehicles, tanks, helicopters and warplanes are said to be concentrated now in Central Mindanao.
In other events, ARMM elections that were due in September were postponed. Three priority bills have been filed in Congress to amend the Organic Act on the ARMM, expanding it in accordance with the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. A plebiscite on the new autonomous region was due by the end of the year, but was deferred.
In the beginning of the new millennium, heavy fightings in Central Mindanao, between the GRP and MILF forces, continued and began to escalate. It started in North Cotabato from November to December 1999, and in Maguindanao from January to February 2000, while the first round of the GRP-MILF formal talks were taking place on January 17-20.
During the talks, the MILF had expressed fears that their officials sitting with the government at the negotiating table might be arrested in the absence of immunity guarantees. The government, in response, gave assurances that the MILF delegates would be given identification cards that will recognize them.
Earlier, on Jan. 9-12, Camp Omar Al-Farouk in Maguindanao, a major MILF camp recognized by the MILF-GRP Second Joint Acknowledgement, was attacked twice by the military on orders of AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Angelo Reyes. One of the attacks occurred as the MILF were preparing for the end of Ramadan, the holiest of Islamic feasts.
On February 7-8, 2000, the GRP-MILF technical committees met and the government clarified that the security guarantees could be given to the MILF panel members, but not "immunity guarantees" as earlier requested by the MILF forces.
A few days later, the MILF exposed a military operation codenamed "Oplan Makabayan" that "intended to drive out the Moro rebels from their territorial strongholds in Central Mindanao."
On February 21, 2000, the military took the MILF's Camp Omar Al Farouk outside Cotabato City. Four days later, a ferry was bombed in Ozamiz City that killed 25 people. The military blamed the MILF for said explosion. This sparked the war in Lanao del Norte in March, almost simultaneously with the abduction of some 27 local residents of Basilan by the Abu Sayyaf. 19
Towards the end of April, as the armed conflict subsided in Lanao del Norte, the AFP was monitored starting to mass-up their forces at the foot of Camp Abubakar, the largest camp of the MILF in Matanog, Maguindanao. Renewed clashes took place in Matanog, and at almost the same time, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 23 tourists from Sabah, Malaysia.
On April 26, six Catholic bishops and four members of the Ulama League of the Philippines who met in the Bishops-Ulama Forum20 or BUF issued a statement calling for a renewed ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities in Central Mindanao. Their four-point statement clarified that the war in Central Mindanao "is not a religious war between Christians and Muslims" but an armed confrontation between the Philippine military and the MILF. It condemned the formation of extremist vigilante groups, saying "this will only polarize cultural communities." It sought a continuation of the peace process and offered the assistance of the bishops and the ulama in pushing forward the peace process through consultations with grassroots communities and attending to the root causes of the conflict.
The BUF also underscored the distinction between the hostage issue in Basilan (involving the Abu Sayyaf) and the conflict in Central Mindanao, particularly in Lanao del Sur, involving the MILF, saying the latter "represents the aspirations of the Muslim community" in Mindanao.
On April 27, the GRP and MILF peace panels met and by midnight were able to reach an agreement to "normalize the brewing situation in Central Mindanao, Lanao area, and the Narciso Ramos Highway." In this meeting, the GRP and MILF peace panels both agreed to get back on the road to peace and shall ask the joint ceasefire committee to study the following proposals:
Barely six hours after the signing of the document, the AFP troops assaulted the MILF positions in Buldon, Maguindanao. Apparently, it was learned that the agreement did not reach the 6th Infantry Division in time. The battle for control of the 10- to 15-kilometer stretch of the 184-kilometer Narciso Ramos Highway linking the cities of Cotabato and Marawi had brought the two sides "on the road to war."
On April 30, the MILF unilaterally suspended peace talks with the government. In a declaration signed by Al Haj Murad, the MILF's vice-chair for military affairs, he accused the military of violating a 1997 ceasefire agreement by attacking several of the MILF's camps.
The MILF indefinitely suspended the peace talks two days after heavy fighting erupted at the defense perimeter of Camp Abubakar, near Cotabato City, the MILF's biggest base, a self-contained community with the MILF considering it a "counterpart" of Camp Aguinaldo, the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The military, on the other hand, claimed that it was not attacking Camp Abubakar. The 10,000-hectare camp straddles some towns adjacent to the highway in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado said the military "was only doing what is mandated of it --- to free the Narciso Ramos Highway21 of mulcters and extortionists … We are clearing the area, but they (the MILF) have refused to believe it and they're gathering forces there and making it difficult for us."
On May 2, Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo, Archbishop of Cotabato City and Chairman of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issued the following statement:
"Because of broken agreements between the GRP and the MILF, hundreds are being killed, while thousands of Muslim, Christian and Lumad families are fleeing for their lives. They leave behind their homes, their means of livelihood, their farms, their working animals. They suffer the anguish of displacement, the insecurity of food, the trauma of manmade fear, the terrible anxiety of the future."
He (Archbishop Quevedo) urgently and strongly appealed to both the GRP and MILF:
On May 3, the Independent Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC) issued a statement appealing to the GRP and the MILF to "declare a 72-hour truce to facilitate high-level negotiations to work out a ceasefire."
On May 5, the government's Cabinet Cluster E met and decided on the following:
On May 7, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) reported that the number of people affected by the clashes in three provinces had reached 123,758, or 23,031 families, of whom 74,691 were housed in evacuation centers. Feeding at least 100,000 evacuees in Maguindanao alone would require 2,000 bags or 1.4 million pesos a day. In one week alone, which is 9.8 million pesos. This does not include the cost of canned goods, dried fish and noodles --- the usual foodstuffs distributed as relief goods --- or medicines because evacuations cause illnesses.
On May 9, a "Peace Now Movement," composed of different church groups, Muslim groups, Christian and human rights NGOs, was formed in Manila and issued a press statement calling for the GRP and MILF to "immediately declare multilateral ceasefire, sincerely go back to the negotiating table, and stop the war in Mindanao."
On May 12, Presidential spokesperson Ricardo Puno, Jr. disclosed the talking points of the MILF contained in a letter handed to Executive Secretary Zamora:
On the same day, the Independent Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC) has offered a solution to the highway problem: "The MILF should move back a kilometer away from the highway and government should immediately declare a ceasefire."
In response, the government forwarded the following:
On May 16, the government had drawn up the following four-point agenda for continuing talks with the MILF:
In the meantime, at least five bombs were dropped on Camp Abubakar at noon as Philippine Marines moved closer to the MILF headquarters. This occurred after MILF forces moved a kilometer away from their original positions on the highway, in accordance with an order from MILF chief Al Haj Murad, while government forces claimed to have regained full control of the Narciso Ramos Highway. The government soldiers also recovered the bodies of 12 Marines who were killed "in a failed attempt to overrun the MILF's network of fortified bunkers and trenches in Matanog town on April 29."
On May 18, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urged the government to disregard the document signed by its peace negotiators acknowledging some camps of the MILF as "MILF territory." Earlier, Senator Renato Cayetano (who is also a lawyer) described as "treason" the official acknowledgment of Camp Abubakar and some other "rebel camps" as MILF territory.
On May 25, Archbishop Quevedo, the CBCP President, lauded over the announcement of the resumption of the peace talks between the government and the MILF. He said: "I am convinced that a just and lasting peace can be achieved by peaceful dialogue without Filipinos killing and hating one another." In a statement released on this day, the CBCP President mentioned three requirements necessary to begin the talks, namely:
He further identified the following specific "doables" which he thought would serve to normalize the situation:
Earlier the government has offered a three-point agenda to be discussed during the resumption of the peace talks with the MILF on May 30:
A day before the resumption of the GRP-MILF 4th Round of Talks, the Inter-Faith Solidarity for Justice and Peace in Mindanao or IFSJP-Mindanao was launched this May 29 in Quezon City. The IFSJP-Mindanao is a broad campaign alliance formation, aimed at preventing more bloodshed in Mindanao, and shall work for a peaceful and more comprehensive approach to the Mindanao crisis, particularly the use of negotiations and political solutions to the Muslim and other insurgency problems in the country.
KUSOG-Mindanao recently held a Peace Summit in Davao City.
With this standing schedule for the resumption of the talks between the GRP and the MILF on May 30, tension grips the air in Central Mindanao and what can best describe the GRP-MILF peace negotiations at this point in time is that the talks are running on "bumpy ground." A Mindanao professor, Prof. Rudy Rodil22 , provided the following images of the GRP-MILF peace talks. He said, "monitoring their peace talks is like seeing a good movie with a very complex plot and numerous sub-plots woven into each other. One is never able to tell the rise and fall of the story or what the ending of each sub-plot will be until the next one comes around."23
Despite fierce hostilities, both the GRP and the MILF have declared openness to the resumption of their peace negotiations, with the latter setting no preconditions for them. The continuing pronouncements by both sides of supporting military actions, however, have not facilitated the de-escalation of the all-out offensives the parties have waged against each other. In their pursuit of peace in Mindanao, both the GRP and MILF have yet to go beyond the issue of a temporary ceasefire to the more substantive issue of Muslim autonomy.
As the war was raging in Lanao del Norte, particularly in Kauswagan town and its adjoining villages, a group of 60 members of the Al Haratul Islamiya, originally called the Abu Sayyaf, an extremist Muslim guerrilla group, attacked last March 20 an Army outpost in Basilan. This extremist group seized 77 people, including a priest (the Rev. Roel Gallardo, director of the Claret High School), a principal (Reynaldo Rubio), teachers and students from two schools. About 20 of the students were later freed by the rebels.
The Al Haratul Islamiya is the new name of the Abu Sayyaf, reported to be responsible for a series of kidnappings, bombings and other terrorist attacks in Western Mindanao. Headed allegedly by Khadafy Montano Janjalani, brother of Abu Sayyaf chieftain Ustadz Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani who was killed in December 1998, the Al Haratul Islamiya is said to be fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao.
On March 21, the Al Haratul Islamiya threatened to kill its hostages if the military would press its assault, but offered to free some of the children held captive in exchange for food and medicine.
On March 22, Armed Forces chief General Angelo Reyes rejected any negotiations with the Al Haratul Islamiya for the release of 42 hostages still being held in two jungle hideouts in Basilan. The government's policy, according to Gen. Reyes, is that they don't negotiate with terrorists. What the military wanted to happen was to continue "recovery efforts and pursuit operations" so that they can recover hostages. Reyes further said that the military would not oppose other groups negotiating for the hostages' release as long as they would not hamper efforts to rescue them.
Earlier, the guerrillas released a pregnant teacher and two students to representatives of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) and the Roman Catholic Church.
On March 23, Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Ahmad said they would release 10 more captives in exchange for 200 sacks of rice, canned goods and medicines to be delivered to the rebel hideout by the local Red Cross representatives and the Roman Catholic Church. Ahmad relayed the demand to Basilan Representative Abdulgani Salapuddin who initiated talks with the rebel last March 22. Ahmad also urged the military to call off pursuit operations, warning that it would only endanger the lives of the hostages who would be "killed like goats and sent to the town." Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado said that the military would not object to negotiations being held by civilians, but stressed that the government's no-ransom policy should be upheld.
The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) designated Bishop Romulo de la Cruz to negotiate with this Abu Sayyaf group in Basilan for the safe release of the hostages in Basilan. The Bishop-Ulama Forum of Western Mindanao also appealed to the Abu Sayyaf to immediately free their hostages and asked the military to call off any offensive that might endanger the lives of the captives.
On May 3, government troops rescued more hostages of the Abu Sayyaf. Survivors said the rebels executed Fr. Roel Gallardo and three other teachers. The three showed signs of torture when they died.
In Basilan, the Philippine flag was flown at half-mast in military detachments, schools, hospitals and Catholic churches in the towns of Isabela, Tumahubong and Sumisip. Also in Isabela, walls, gates and doors of houses, shops, schools and government offices were painted with red crosses. The half-mast flag and the red crosses are all symbols for mourning.
As of this writing, 11 abducted in Basilan are still in the hands of the Abu Sayyaf.
On April 23 (Easter Sunday), another Abu Sayyaf group grabbed 19 foreigners that include a German family of three, two French, two South Africans, two Finns, one Lebanese, and nine Malaysians and 2 (two) Filipinos from a Malaysian diving resort off Sabah and drove to Jolo.
On April 28, the Abu Sayyaf gunmen holding the 19 foreigners and 2 Filipinos announced that they want the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to intervene in this crisis. They have yet to give a written demand though.
On April 29, Malaysian police detained some 600 Filipino illegal immigrants, mostly women and children, for questioning regarding this April 23 abduction of 21 people off Sabah.
On May 8, the Abu Sayyaf demanded that ambassadors from all the captives' nations be involved in the negotiations for their release aside from Gov. Nur Misuari of the ARMM. In a handwritten note sent through Misuari's emissaries, the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf also demanded for seven (7) intermediaries that include Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, two Muslim scholars, representatives of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the United Nations, members of the local and foreign media and the Libyan ambassador.
On May 9, Javier Solana, the European Union (EU) security and foreign policy adviser arrived in Manila despite the Philippine government's resistance to foreign intervention to resolve the foreign hostage crisis in Sulu. The Philippine government has repeatedly insisted that the kidnapping is a domestic issue and has refused to include other countries in the negotiations.
On the same day, former Libyan Ambassador to the Philippines Abdul Rajah Azzarouq arrived in Jolo. He was sent by Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, at the request of the German government, to negotiate the release of the Abu Sayyaf hostages in Jolo. Azzarouq was part of the six-nation OIC panel that brokered the historic 1996 pact between the Philippine government and the MNLF. During his tenure here, he was credited with the release of several foreign missionaries26 held by the Abu Sayyaf. Upon his arrival, Azzarouq condemned the Abu Sayyaf's kidnapping of innocent civilians as "un-Islamic."
Both Azzarouq and Solana carried messages that they are strongly supportive of the Philippines' efforts to end the hostage situation. Solana conveyed the EU's concern for the safety of the hostages and trust that the Philippine government would pursue a "peaceful negotiated solution" to the situation. Solana said the European community would readily extend whatever assistance asked by the Philippine government. Solana did not specify the kind of assistance, but particularly mentioned "humanitarian" aid to the sick hostages. Solana reportedly also assured President Estrada that the EU's official development assistance to Mindanao would not be affected by the Abu Sayyaf's actions. The EU is the biggest ODA donor in the region.
Even as Azzarouq now appeared to be the government's chief negotiator, Zamora asserted that Nur Misuari's role would remain as the government's chief negotiator. Zamora said that Misuari would not be "undercut" by the efforts being undertaken by the government in broadening the number of emissaries to the Abu Sayyaf.
While Zamora earlier claimed that the EU high official would be relaying expert advice on the matter of the hostages and the "desires" of the 15 countries of the EU, Solana said he did not come here to give advice. Neither did he come here to negotiate. Solana stressed that he came here for the "diplomatic and humanitarian mission."
On May 10, Azzarouq held first talks with the Abu Sayyaf, together with Muslim religious leader Ghazali Ibrahim27 , Dr. Parouk Hussin, foreign affairs committee chair of the MNLF and ARMM Interior Secretary Jamasali Abdurahman.
On May 11, a second meeting between the negotiators and the Abu Sayyaf abductors was cancelled following a military build-up around the planned venue in the coastal town of Patikul in southern Sulu. The rebels had fled with the hostages to another hideout and negotiators were unable to establish contact. The breakdown dealt a blow to efforts to win the immediate release of two ailing European captives.
On this same day, a team of the Malaysian Red Crescent, the equivalent of the Red Cross in Islamic countries, arrived in Jolo after the government granted it permission to extend assistance in the hostage crisis. They will be allowed access to the hostages. The Red Crescent team had four doctors and a complement of nurses and other medical workers.
On May 12, the Abu Sayyaf decided not to release two ailing European captives and to reject the government's negotiating team. Specifically, the Abu Sayyaf, through leader Abu Escobar, said that they wanted negotiator Azzarouq, a former ambassador to the Philippines, replaced by the current envoy. Escobar also said his group was willing to release the two ailing Europeans in exchange for nine relatives of Abu Sayyaf – Basilan leader Khaddafy Janjalani. The relatives are reported to being held in Sumisip, Basilan, by a vigilante group led by Abdul Mijal. Their abduction was known to be in retaliation to the hostage-taking of Mijal's two daughters, who were among the group mostly composed of students and teachers seized by the Abu Sayyaf on March 20 in Basilan.
Mijal's two daughters, along with other hostages, have since been released. But Mijal said Janjalani's relatives would remain captive as long as the Abu Sayyaf continued to hold hostage a number of students and teachers in Basilan.
Escobar also said that last March 11 the Abu Sayyaf leaders met to discuss a request from negotiators for the release of Renate Wallert, a German woman who according to her family had suffered two strokes, and Stephane Loisy, a Frenchman with a urinary tract infection. The leaders had decided to rule out any immediate release, reject the negotiators, and stick with a demand sent to President Estrada in a letter last Saturday (May 6). The demand is that the negotiators include Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ambassadors from the hostages' countries and Libya, and representatives of the United Nations and Islamic Nations.
The extremists have also rejected the government's chief negotiator, Gov. Nur Misuari of the ARMM. They have yet to present a list of formal demands and will only do so to the negotiators they have specified. Informally, however, they have said they want independence for Muslim Mindanao, the establishment of Islamic law, a return to barter trade and a ban on foreign fishing boats. They would like to be given a chance to represent the aspirations of the Muslims. They want development, and they want to do it themselves, to their own way of life. Escobar said the Abu Sayyaf would demand a cessation of military operations in Basilan as a condition for the release of the Jolo hostages.
On May 20, while Philippine government negotiators waited for a signal to resume talks with the Abu Sayyaf abductors in Sulu, Malaysia announced it had already started direct negotiations with the rebels for the release of 21 mostly foreign hostages. Malaysia's ambassador to Manila, Mohamad Arshad Manzoor Hussain, met four commanders of the Abu Sayyaf Muslim rebel group on Thursday (May 18) at the coastal village of Taulug in Jolo.
In a news conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid said the Philippine government was informed in advance of the Thursday meeting. The Associated Press, however, reported that the Malaysian ambassador met with only one commander, Galib Andang, alias Commander Robot. The ambassador had a long meeting with Commander Robot in the jungle, part way up the mountain where the hostages are held, two former rebels who escorted him said.
Malaysia has sought a direct role in negotiations but Manila was previously reluctant to grant this.
Syed Hamid said the commanders' demands were unclear but added that they had ''not made any ransom demands.'' He said the hostage-takers apparently wanted a ''Sabah commission'' established to protect the welfare of Filipinos living in Malaysia's Sabah state on Borneo island. The rebels ''want their position in Sabah protected and to be accorded a special status,'' he told a press conference.
Syed Hamid said Malaysia would listen to and weigh all their demands, and hoped to pursue the talks. ''We will continue to have discussions with the kidnappers since they are interested for us to participate in this crisis,'' he said. ''We want to resolve this crisis as soon as possible. But they do not seem to be concerned about time,'' he also said. Syed Hamid said Malaysia's stand on illegals was clear --- they will be repatriated. The rebels should not hold innocent people to make their demands, he said. There are about 500,000 Filipino illegal immigrants in Sabah, he said. Most are of the Tausug clan from Jolo.
Earlier, on May 17, the European parliament called on the 15 European Union member states to help Manila find a quick, peaceful end to the crisis. In a resolution, Euro MPs proposed that the EU and its executive branch, the European Commission, undertake a long-term aid program to ease tension in Sulu and neighboring islands in Mindanao.
On May 23, an endowment fund coming from a Libyan foundation, the Gadhafi Foundation, was offered to be funneled to the Abu Sayyaf. It was clarified that this was not "ransom" money but, as a "humanitarian gesture," for scholarships and other forms of assistance for the Muslim extremists.
On May 27, the government and the Abu Sayyaf leaders finally started talks to free 21 Western and Asian hostages who have been held captive by the latter for more than a month already.
1 The MNLF was founded in 1969, with Nur Misuari as the Chairman. He has led the MNLF ever since. Its first members were drawn from youth recruited by the traditional Muslim leaders for military training in Malaysia. Like Misuari, these young men had secular education, and some had briefly taken part in left-wing student politics. They were dissatisfied with the traditional Muslim leadership, which they felt lacked direction. When it was founded, the MNLF's objective was an independent Bangsamoro homeland. However, under pressure from the Islamic states, it has accepted autonomy within the Philippine state. The MNLF's armed group is called the Bangsa Moro Army. In 1994, the Philippine military estimated that the MNLF had 14,080 fighters. The MNLF's main bases are in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and the Zamboanga peninsula. It also has a presence in parts of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani (or General Santos City), and South Cotabato. The members are predominantly, but not exclusively, from the Tausug, Samal and Yakan ethnic groups.
2 From the war between the GRP and MNLF, it had changed to a war between the GRP and the MILF, and the GRP and Abu Sayyaf.
3 The MILF is a breakaway from the MNLF. In 1978, shortly after the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement, a group led by MNLF Central Committee member Salamat Hashim broke away from Misuari's MNLF. At first, it called itself the "New MNLF'" but in 1984 it formally established itself as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In the 1990s, the MILF claims to have 120,000 armed and unarmed fighters in Mindanao. Most of its members come from the Maguindanaoan and Iranun ethnic groups, although Maranaw recruits seem to be increasing. Vice-chair for political affairs, Ghazali Jafaar, says that although the MILF respects the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 'the Bangsamoro has the final say.'
4 Kadtuntaya Foundation, A Situationer on the Mindanao Peace Crises, May 11, 2000.
5 Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p.3.
6 Reference to Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989.
7 Hampson, Ibid.
8 Mara Stankovitch and Andy Carl, Conciliation Resources "One Step Towards Peace" (London: March 1999).
The OIC or Organization of Islamic Conference was created in response to the burning of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in 1969. Perceiving Islam and Muslims to be under attack, the foreign ministers of predominantly Muslim states agreed to create a pan-Islamic organization to assert Islamic solidarity. To maintain credibility, the OIC had to be seen to support beleaguered Muslim communities, and its interventions had to have a basis in Islamic teachings. When, in 1972, Philippine Muslim politicians brought their grievances to the OIC, the latter felt bound to respond. Its Conference of Foreign Ministers first announced its interest in the problems of Philippine Muslims. Later conferences issued a series of resolutions criticizing the Philippine government's actions, supporting most MNLF demands and indicating the implicit support of the Islamic world for the struggle of fellow Muslims in the Philippines.
9 However, OIC support for the MNLF and solidarity with fellow Muslims in the Philippines were circumscribed by geography. The distance separating the Philippines from the Middle East has limited the flow of money and arms to Moro guerrilla forces to whatever could be smuggled through from the Malaysian state of Sabah. Politically, the self-interest of multi-ethnic Islamic states, like Indonesia, as well as international law which inhibit support for secessionism, meant that the OIC always stopped short of backing the MNLF demand for independence. In the end, this forced the MNLF to lower its aspirations from independence to political autonomy within the framework of Philippine territorial integrity (Jamal A. Kamlian, Islamic Solidarity).
10 Tripoli Agreement – This agreement was so named because it was signed at Tripoli, Libya on December 23, 1976 between representatives of the MNLF and the GRP, with the participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, the members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to find for a just and peaceful political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines.
Essentially, the agreement provides for the establishment of Autonomy within the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic, encompassing the thirteen provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao Sur, South Cotabato and Palawan and all the cities and villages in the above-mentioned areas.
11 Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sarrangani, and Palawan.
12 Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga, and Puerto Princesa.
13 Notre Dame Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, October 1999, p. 45.
14 Notre Dame Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, October 1999, p. 44.
15 Macapado A. Muslim, "Sustaining the Constituency for Moro Autonomy".
16 Compiled from the daily reports of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, and the TFDP-Iligan Report (Notes on the MILF-GRP Conflict, March 2000).
17 The Investigative Reporting Magazine, Vol. III, No. 3, July-September 1997, p. 30.
18 Kadtuntaya Foundation, A Situationer on the Mindanao Peace Crises, May 11, 2000.
19 The Abu Sayyaf ("father of the sword") was founded in mid-1980s to propagate Islam through 'jihad.' Its founder and leader, Aburajak Abubakar Janjalani, was an Islamic scholar and previously a member of the MNLF. He was killed in an encounter with the AFP in December 1998. Few details are known about this group, whose base is on the island of Basilan. They appear to have little popular support. Most non-members describe it as Islamic fundamentalist, and many violent incidents in Mindanao have bee attributed to it. These include an attack on the town of Ipil in 1995 killing 50 people, several explosions in churches and a grenade attack in a Zamboanga department store just before Christmas 1998, injuring 60 people. Its members are said to be former MNLF guerrillas who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s. Edwin Angeles, a convert to Islam who commanded Abu Sayyaf military operations in the early 1990s, was later revealed to be a police agent. He left the Abu Sayyaf in 1995, and was killed in January 1999, soon after Janjalani.
20 Bishops-Ulama Forum, composed of Catholic and Protestant bishops and Muslim religious leaders in Mindanao, is a dialogue forum organized in 1996 in the spirit of interreligious dialogue and commitment to the peace process.
21 The Narciso Ramos Highway, named after former President Fidel Ramos' father, who had served as foreign secretary on the 1960s, was inaugurated on April 15, 1996. Not only was the Ramos Highway viewed as a road linking Cotabato and Marawi cities, but it was discouraged that it shall link "Central Mindanao and the ARMM to the rest of the Philippines and of Asia and the Pacific."
While the flow of people, commerce and trade did happen, it was only on a limited scale because of the many checkpoints along the route installed by the military, the police, the MNLF, the MILF and various armed groups --- enough to discourage commuters and entrepreneurs. From the junction of the highway leading to Cotabato City, there are 23 checkpoints until Matanog town, two of them belonging to the MNLF and the rest, the Army, police, Marines and civilian volunteer organizations. Extortion is reported rampant on this road of checkpoints, prompting entrepreneurs to take the longer but less "expensive" routes out of Cotabato City. On a 10- to 15-kilometer stretch of the highway could be seen checkpoints being manned by MILF guerrillas. They were particularly visible in Matanog town, the entry point to Camp Abubakar. Matanog is the last Maguindanao town on the highway. The town after it is Balabagan in Lanao del Sur.
22 Prof. Rudy Rodil is a faculty member of the Mindanao State University (MSU) in Iligan City. He was a member of the Government panel for talks with the MNLF from 1992-1996.
23 Rudy B. Rodil, The Saga of the GRP-MILF Peace Talks, October 15, 1996 – December 30, 1997.
24 Compiled from the daily news of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star.
25 Compiled from the daily news of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star.
26 The foreign missionaries included Belgian Roman Catholic missionary Luciano Benedetti in 1998, American linguist Charles Walton in 1993 and two Spanish Catholic nuns, also in 1998.
27
Ghazali Ibrahim is an Islamic scholar who graduated from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt and well-traveled in the Middle East. Ibrahim was a childhood buddy of Abu Sayyaf leader Ghalib Andang, alias Commander Robot. Ibrahim replaced ARMM Gov. Nur Misuari, who was initially handpicked by Pres. Estrada to spearhead the talks with the Abu Sayyaf.
